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Abstract
Critical realism has become increasingly well known in the social sciences, particularly for its trenchant critiques of
forms of idealism such as positivism and interpretivism. Rarely, however, has critical realism itself been subjected to
critique. This article argues that realism and idealism are just two sides of the same foundationalist coin, with both
making ontological claims that seem to be unfalsifiable. So far, the application of critical realism to housing studies has
not proved to be particularly fruitful, and the advances made by critical realists may have been in spite of, rather than
because of, their commitment to critical realism.
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Glossary
g0005 Critical realism The belief that reality exists
independently of the human mind but cannot be
completely or certainly known.
g0010 Epistemology A theory of knowledge, of how the world
is known or can be known.
g0015 Fallibilism The belief that our knowledge of reality can
always be shown to be false.
g0020 Foundationalism The belief that our knowledge of reality
has sure foundations – that is, it can be proved to be true.
g0025 Idealism The belief that reality is to be identified with
our ideas of it – that is, our conceptualisations, social
constructions, discourse, and so on.
g0030Neo-institutionalism The study of institutions as
shapers of people’s actions and perceptions, within
broader social environments.
g0035Ontology A theory of being or existence, of how the
world is or can be.
g0040System A set of entities that are necessarily related to
one another.
g0045Transcendental argument An argument that a
proposition must be true in order for another proposition
to be true, and the truth of the latter proposition is
already known.
s0005 Critical Realism – A Critique
p0005 The nature of critical realism is disputed but is commonly
associated with the work of Roy Bhaskar. Following
Sayer, it can be characterised as a combination of a realist
ontology (or theory of being, of how the world is) with a
fallibilist epistemology (or theory of knowledge, of how
the world is known). Realism here means the belief that
reality exists independently of the human mind, with the
latter being typically understood as perception (the obser-
ver), cognition (the knower), or thought (the thinker).
Fallibilism is the belief that our knowledge of reality
always has a chance of being proved wrong, that is, our
knowledge has no sure foundations. Sayer argues that the
two beliefs are logically connected in that it is precisely
because reality exists beyond human thought that we
cannot be sure of our knowledge of it.
p0010 Critical realism is usually assumed to be antifounda-
tionalist, that is, as denying the possibility that knowledge
has sure foundations. The belief that our knowledge has
no sure foundations, however, itself lacks foundation, that
is, it is fallible. In other words, we can never be sure
whether or not our knowledge has sure foundations.
Arguably also, fallibilism should hold for the belief in
realism itself; that is, the belief that reality exists indepen-
dently of the human mind has no sure foundations.
Consequently, not only can we not be sure whether our
beliefs about reality and our possible knowledge of it are
true but we also cannot even be sure about how unsure we
should be about the truth of these beliefs (I call this a
nonfoundationalist position). Yet, as Hume recognised,
life goes on as before – observing, naming, categorising,
analysing, theorising, evaluating, acting, and so forth.
p0015Realists assume that realism must be true in order to
explain why our knowledge of reality is fallible – an
example of what Kant called a transcendental argument.
There are other possible reasons, however, why our
knowledge is fallible: our capacity for knowing could be
defective, for example, or reality could be constantly
changing, or both. There does not seem to be any way
of deciding which of these possibilities is more likely. The
argument for the transcendental argument therefore
appears unconvincing.
p0020As well as offering beliefs about the world and our
possible knowledge of it, critical realists make substantive
claims about the world, for example, that it has different
‘layers’: empirical, actual, and real. On closer inspection,
however, these terms appear to refer to things we already
know in the world, namely, experiences, events, and
objects. It is not clear that translation of these constituents
of the world into ‘layers of reality’ adds anything to our
knowledge. Similarly, with regard to social reality, critical
realists appear to subscribe to a form of ‘analytical dual-
ism’, according to which ‘structure’ and ‘action’ are
interdependent and mutually constitutive but not reduci-
ble to each other. The precise nature of these structures
and actions, however, is left to be specified by research.
p0025It seems reasonable to assume that our knowledge is
part of the world – because, if it were not part of the
world, where would it be? So, if critical realism tells us
nothing new about the world, then it follows that it tells us
nothing new about our knowledge of the world. So what is
HOUS 00604
1
EL
SE
VI
ER
FI
RS
T
PR
O
O
F
it for? A common argument here is that critical realists
function as ‘under-labourers’ for the sciences; that is,
although they create no new knowledge themselves, they
facilitate the creation of knowledge by others. It is by no
means clear, however, that critical realists do perform such
a facilitative role, or even that scientists are in need of their
philosophical assistance. One might ask why it is not pos-
sible, or indeed preferable, for scientists to develop their
own theories and research designs for themselves.
p0030 Perhaps, however, the value of critical realism lies in
its function as critique, for example, of forms of positivism
(crudely understood as seeking regularities, as in the
search for statistical associations between variables) and
interpretivism (crudely understood as seeking meaning
rather than causes). Certainly, SayerAU1 (2000) contains a
good deal of criticism of variants of postmodernism,
strong social constructionism, and anti-essentialism, to
name but a few. The thrust of his criticism is that all of
these currents of thought appear to deny that there is a
reality outside of thought itself, with ‘thought’ being
expressed in discourse or language or whatever. I take
him to be saying that these currents of thought all involve
varieties of idealism, that is, a belief that reality is to be
identified with our conceptualisations (or social construc-
tions) of it. Clearly, this belief contradicts realism.
p0035 The realist critique of idealism is problematic, how-
ever. Sayer seems to think that strong social
constructionists, for example, although claiming to be
antifoundationalist, must be foundationalists. In fact, how-
ever, critical realists, no less than strong social
constructionists, seem to have foundational beliefs
(namely, in favour of, rather than opposed to, the inde-
pendent existence of reality). If we take fallibilism
seriously, then neither realism nor idealism has sure
foundations. One can be just as fallible about one’s own
social constructions as about the world that lies beyond
those constructions. A more logical position, therefore,
would be that of nonfoundationalism, as outlined above.
p0040 Critical realism also involves a distinctive approach to
research. The argument is that if we conceive the world as
consisting of dispositions, series of events, and systems of
relations, then we are able to make more and better sense
of it. Critical realists criticise traditional approaches in
research, for example, those that attempt to identify reg-
ularities among sequences of events. This is expressed
most forcefully by Sayer (2000: 14):
. . . for realists, causation is not understood on the model of
regular successions of events, and hence explanation need
not depend on finding them, or searching for putative
social laws. The conventional impulse to prove causation
by gathering data on regularities, repeated occurrences, is
therefore misguided; at best these might suggest where to
look for candidates for causal mechanisms. What causes
something to happen has nothing to do with the number
of times we have observed it happening. Explanation
depends instead on identifying causal mechanisms and
how they work, and discovering if they have been acti-
vated and under what conditions.
p0045There are some problems with this line of argument,
however. First, the identification of such ‘causal mechan-
isms’ cannot prove that realism itself is true (or false) – the
causal mechanisms may or may not exist independently of
thought. The commitment to identify causal mechanisms
is therefore not exclusive to a realist position (consider
Kant’s position of transcendental idealism). Second, if the
causation has nothing to do with observational regularity,
how does it come to be known in such a way that there is a
chance of proving otherwise? If, say, we have observed
something to happen only once or a small number of
times, how can we be sure that this has not happened by
chance? If we take fallibilism seriously, then arguably the
postulating of causal mechanisms must be subject to
observational testing of some kind.
p0050In social research, the issue is often one of wanting to
know the effects of a particular intervention without neces-
sarily having much knowledge of the causal mechanisms
involved. Interventions are made without clear under-
standing of their potential effects, with the result that it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to establish whether
the observations that follow the intervention are actually
effects of that intervention or not. So-called realistic eva-
luation does not help here because it appears to fall short of
identifying particular causal mechanisms, let alone
explaining what effects those mechanisms could have.
p0055In the absence of a theory of the field (in Bourdieu’s
sense) in which the intervention takes place (such a the-
ory needs to generate hypotheses that can be tested in the
field), AU2the most valid research method would appear to be
that of randomised control trials (RCTs). This is because
such trials rely on the random selection of a requisite
variety of contexts in which the intervention is or is not
to take place; statistical comparison of the differences
between the contexts of intervention and nonintervention
then enables the identification of real effects of the inter-
vention. It is important to note, however, that the causal
mechanisms whereby those effects are produced remain
unknown. For this reason, RCTs cannot substitute for
theory development, whether realist or otherwise.
s0010Critical Realism and Housing (Homelessness
and Housing Systems)
p0060Critical realism has not figured greatly in housing
research. Homelessness, however, has been a topic that
has received some attention from critical realists, particu-
larly in relation to the search for its causes. So, let us
consider homelessness from a critical realist standpoint
and see where the argument leads.
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p0065 First of all, what is homelessness? Is it empirical, actual,
or real; that is, is it an experience, an event, or an object?
For critical realists, it is all of these things: it is experienced
by those who become homeless, it is an event in their lives
that can be observed by others, and it is a socially struc-
tured object that can be investigated and analysed by
researchers. The nature of homelessness, however, is con-
testable: definitions and interpretations can vary. If we
cannot agree on what homelessness is, then how can we
agree on what its causes might be? Fitzpatrick argues that,
although experiences and events vary, it is possible to
identify ‘real’ homelessness as a condition that emerges
from a range of separate and complex ‘pathways’ into and
through homelessness. ‘Real’ homelessness exists whether
or not it is experienced as such and whether or not people
agree on what actually counts as homelessness. ‘Real’
homelessness is a state of being that results from specific
sequences of interconnected events in people’s lives.
p0070 Considered over time, therefore, homelessness is a ‘rea-
listic’ category. If we assume this to be correct, what then
could be the causes of homelessness? At this point,
Fitzpatrick’s account becomes problematic in a number of
respects. First, criticising Williams for his rejection of home-
lessness as a realistic category, she writes ‘‘Homelessness
[unlike Greekness, as used by Williams] is not a cultural
phenomenon, but rather a signifier of objective material and
social conditions.’’ Unfortunately, this resurrects the old
chestnut of the distinction between ‘structure’ and ‘culture’,
with the former being equated with ‘objectivity’ and the
latter with ‘subjectivity’. In reality, however, ‘culture’ can
have structure and ‘structure’ can include culture. In the case
of homelessness, for example, it could be argued that it is
possible only in a sedentary culture, where it is assumed that
people should have fixed spaces in which they reside or
dwell. In any case, Fitzpatrick’s assertion is probably tauto-
logical, because she has already constructed homelessness as
having to do with complex pathways, which are not be
understood as ‘cultural’ products. Homelessness can, how-
ever, be defined in other ways, for example, as rootlessness,
which looks more like a cultural phenomenon. Perhaps the
lesson to be (re)learnt from this is that homelessness is not
just a realistic category but also has cultural significance – or,
to put it more correctly, the reality of homelessness is
cultural as well as material.
p0075 A second problem for Fitzpatrick is that the category
of homelessness lacks conceptual coherence. What is
required here are ‘‘overlapping, shared (but not necessa-
rily identical) experiences which give rise to similar
impacts on individuals (that is, similar emergent attributes
and causal tendencies)’’. It is interesting to note that this
sounds remarkably similar to the observed regularities
sought by nonrealists. Currently, however, it is not clear
if what is generallyAU3 regarded as the homeless population
meets this regularity requirement. As Fitzpatrick puts it,
there is a ‘‘question mark over the appropriate scope of
the ‘real’ conceptualisation of homelessness’’.
p0080Given this uncertainty about whether homelessness is
a realistic category at all, or whether instead only realistic
subcategories can be identified, such as single rough slee-
pers or occasional hostel dwellers or family bed-and-
breakfast residents, it seems that further research may be
required before it becomes possible to identify the
mechanisms that cause homelessness. (The very concept
AU4of a realistic category, at least as outlined by Fitzpatrick, is
suspect. What emerges from her analysis is a construction
of homelessness, not as a state of being but as a sequential
repeated pattern of specific experiences associated with
specific emergent attributes. This is surely a variant of
Hume’s constant conjunctions, which she earlier criticised
as positivist.) Fitzpatrick hypothesises a number of factors
that could act as such mechanisms (economic structures,
housing structures, patriarchy, and individual attributes).
These mechanisms, however, with the possible exception
of patriarchy, seem little more than an elaboration of the
structural and individual factors that form the ‘new ortho-
doxy’ of homelessness explanation that she criticised
earlier in her article.
p0085The question here is how are the hypotheses to be
operationalised and tested? In a process of what might be
called retroductive testing, Fitzpatrick notes that poverty
seems to be universally implicated in the causation of
homelessness, not just directly through inability to afford
housing but also indirectly ‘‘through an array of necessary
(‘internal’) and contingent (‘external’) relationships’’
involving other causal mechanisms. The feedback loops
involved ‘‘can be interpreted as increasing the ‘weight of
the weighted possibility’ of homelessness amongst certain
poor people’’.
p0090Given the lack of specification of these feedback loops
or of the weights of the different causal mechanisms apart
from poverty, this analysis does not seem to say much
more than that poverty is the primary risk factor for
homelessness, while other factors are secondary. The
relationship between primary and secondary factors and
the relative importance of the different secondary factors
(in different circumstances) are only briefly discussed.
Consequently, it is not clear from this that whether AU5intro-
ducing a critical realist interpretation adds anything to
what is already known about homelessness. Indeed, an
analysis of risk factors (criticised earlier in the article as
positivistic) seems preferable in that it has, for example,
clearer potential predictive value.
p0095Arguing from the position of a critical realist model of
contextual rational action theory, Nicholls provides evi-
dence to show that homeless people themselves can be
(partly) responsible for increasing the ‘‘weight of the
weighted possibility’’ of their homelessness, in a variety
of ways such as substance misuse, prostitution, noncoo-
peration with the authorities, and transgression generally.
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Critical Realism 3
EL
SE
VI
ER
FI
RS
T
PR
O
O
F
This is important for showing how critical realism can
take agency seriously, and this in turn reveals that home-
lessness as a realistic category may be even less coherent
than envisaged. The sheer variety of individual experi-
ences of, and responses to, homelessness suggests that the
scope for overlapping, shared experiences giving rise to
similar impacts may be very small indeed.
p0100 Nicholls ends her article with a challenge: ‘‘The next
step is to theorise the causation of homelessness with
social structures explicitly written back in.’’ It is not
clear how this is to be done, however, when social theory
in relation to homelessness remains so undeveloped and
when both the effects and capacity of agency continue to
be so little understood. Moreover, if Fitzpatrick is right
about poverty being the main cause of homelessness,
there is an argument for giving more priority to identify-
ing and tackling the causes of poverty than the causes of
homelessness.
p0105 As noted above, Lawson (2006) is an exceptional piece
of work in many ways. It acknowledges a considerable
debt to critical realism in steering a course between posi-
tivism on the one hand and interpretivism on the other. It
attempts to analyse the social relations of housing provi-
sion in Australia and the Netherlands, providing
extremely rich and detailed case studies of the two coun-
tries. It distinguishes between necessary and contingent
relations, and identifies causes in terms of the former. Its
focus seems clearer than that of homelessness in that it
studies each national housing system as a whole. In so
doing, it provides an example of what a wider analysis of
housing using a critical realist framework can look like.
p0110 The distinction between necessary and contingent
relations, however, is insufficiently clear. Although
Lawson talks of housing systems in terms of clusters of
relations of both kinds, the concept of a (national) housing
system remains unanalysed. Is it a realistic category or
not? Once again, it seems that critical realism in itself does
not help to identify real causes, and problems always
remain about knowing whether causes have been cor-
rectly identified. (For example, LawsonAU6 identifies an
underlying cause as associated with fundamental change,
but the association only works ‘‘under the right contingent
conditions’’. Critical realism does not help to identify
what can count as fundamental change, what causes
such change, or what can count as the right (or wrong)
contingent conditions.) In any case, as already noted
above, the identification of causes can be undertaken
without necessarily subscribing to a realist position (for
more details see article on Path Dependency).
p0115 Actually, Lawson inclines towards something more
akin to a neo-institutionalist or systems approach because
of the way, for example, she identifies ‘roots’ of causality
in different forms of housing provision (based on histori-
cally and geographically specific relations of property,
finance, and labour) and because of her use of neo-
institutionalist concepts such as those of embeddedness,
path dependency, and institutional fix. No doubt she
found critical realism very helpful in her work but, with
hindsight, it does not seem to have been necessary for her
undoubtedly considerable achievement.
s0015Conclusions
p0120Critical realism is a philosophy that aims to assist the
growth of scientific knowledge by clearing up conceptual
confusions, removing obstacles to clear thinking, pointing
to how science needs to be developed, and so on. Where it
succeeds in its aim to act as underlabourer to the sciences,
however, it does not appear to add anything of value to
our knowledge. This is because, as argued here, critical
realists have not reflected sufficiently on the foundations
of their own knowledge. They consider themselves to be
fallibilist, but they hold to the truth of realism, which
appears to be unfalsifiable. They consider themselves to
be antifoundationalist, but they believe that realism is the
foundation of all (fallible) knowledge. They are critical of
idealism, but they fail to see that it is a mirror image of
their own position. They have a distinctive approach to
research, which is laudable in many ways (e.g., the search
for causes, the advocacy of fallibilism), but which does not
need the realist belief that accompanies it and may not be
entirely compatible with fallibilism itself.
p0125On homelessness, for example, despite some sterling
efforts, it appears that critical realists have not as yet
significantly improved our understanding or even assisted
others to do so. They have not pointed to new ways of
doing research into homelessness that could be fruitful,
nor have they suggested how new kinds of theory might
be developed that would provide more satisfactory expla-
nations of what causes homelessness. The causal
mechanisms identified by Fitzpatrick lack precise speci-
fication, thus failing to supersede an analysis in terms of
risk factors. Arguably, as Somerville and Bengtsson, and
Nicholls have advocated, more medium-range theorising
such as contextual action theory could help to remedy our
current lack of understanding of the complex causation of
homelessness. Alternatively, research into the reasons
why people become homeless could be broadened and
deepened to include research into the reasons why they
are (and by and large remain) poor.
p0130Lawson is the exception here, in that, from a critical
realist perspective, she has substantially increased our
understanding of how housing systems work. In this
case, however, it seems that critical realist thinking,
except insofar as this involves an awareness of the limita-
tions of positivism and interpretivism, was not crucial in
producing this theoretical progress.
See also: Path Dependency (00653) AU7
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